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Summary. According to constitutive reductionism of Derek Parfit, a subject/person is 
not a separate existing being but his existence consists in the existence of a brain and 
body, performance of actions, thinking and occurrence of other physical and mental 
events. The identity of the subject in time comes down only to “Relation R” – mental 
consistency and/or connectedness – elicited by appropriate reasons. In the following 
article, I will try, relying on Frank Johnson’s Knowledge Argument, to argue in favour 
of the following conclusions: (1) a person/subject is a “fact” irreducible to body and 
physical relations with the environment and (2) a subject is something/”fact” non­
­reducible to mental occurrences.
Keywords: subject; person; identity; qualia; consciousness; self­consciousness. 
Epistemological turn in European philosophy started by Descartes – although 
we could distinguish more such turns in the history of human thought – 
starts a process in which the study of the world’s reality is substituted with 
the study of human experience of this reality. In further consequence, these 
studies focus on human subjectivity, consciousness or mind. In this way, it 
seems that the study of consciousness and subjectivity takes a central place 
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in philosophical investigation. Evidently, it does not happen in separation 
from rapidly expanding empirical studies which pose further challenges to 
philosophical reflection on subjectivity. 
Self-consciousness is a term that expresses a self-concept of conscious-
ness. Self- consciousness in its primary meaning is an integral feature 
of consciousness in a sense that there is no self-consciousness without 
consciousness and vice versa. In a more narrow sense, self- consciousness 
is a feature of a higher form of consciousness in which the sense of “I” 
is emphasized (Ziemińska 2012, 395–398). The question of subjectivity, 
consciousness, self-consciousness and self-cognition are important phil-
osophical problems and they are widely discussed. At the same time, the 
experience of self-consciousness is something so obvious to everyone that 
it becomes a subject of consideration only when there are difficulties in its 
normal functioning and when it causes some kind of tension. On the one 
hand, the universality of this phenomenon generates a belief that studying 
and defining of what consciousness and self-consciousness are and how 
they affect human identity should not cause greater problems. On the 
other hand, this issue has been engaging philosophers for centuries and the 
development of knowledge is, as it seems, insignificant and undoubtedly 
unsatisfying, abounding in many divergent positions. 
The positions concerning the possibilities of consciousness cognition are 
divided into three groups. Mysterianistic positions are supported by some 
thinkers who claim that consciousness is a “secret/mystery” that is not the 
subject of rational studies. In contrast, those who support transnaturalistic 
positions claim that consciousness is such a specific subject that the ex-
planation of this phenomenon is out of reach for today’s competence and 
knowledge and that it requires the creation of a new field of science. And 
finally, there are naturalistic positions, which dominate today, and strive 
to explain consciousness with the help of science (Klawiter 2012, 353–356).
The question of consciousness and self-consciousness is associated 
with the issue of personal identity in time. In Critique of Pure Reason Kant 
uses such an analogy: let us imagine a springy ball that hits an identical 
ball in a straight line therefore giving it all its movement and all its state. 
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By analogy, we can comprehend self and subjectivity as a substance from 
which one would “pour” into another its concepts/images together with 
their consciousness. In this way, we can imagine the whole range of such 
substances: the first one would pass the other its own state and the state 
of the previous one and the third one would similarly pass the state to the 
next one with the states of the two previous ones. The last substance in 
a row would be the consciousness of all states and its own state because 
all the previous ones together with their consciousness would be passed 
into this one. That substance, however, would not be the same person in 
all these states (Kant 2001, 331).
Derek Parfit, a British philosopher, calls his strategy of dealing with the 
“troublesome issue” of person’s identity in time constitutive reductionism. 
According to this theory – although a person varies from his body and from 
series of thoughts and experiences – however, “his existence consists only 
of these elements, it is constituted by them.” (Parfit 1988, 440). In Parfit’s 
opinion personal identity should not play any role in practical reasoning. 
For he assumes that criteria of personal identity in time are unreachable 
and redundant (Scruton 2009, 384) and continuity of person’s existence 
directly depends on continuity of his mental/psychological life of which 
brain is the foundation. Parfit reasons in favor of the following conclusions: 
“(1) We are not separately existing entities, apart from our brains and 
bodies, and various interrelated physical and mental events. Our existence 
just involves the existence of our brains and bodies, and the doing of our 
deeds, and the thinking of our thoughts, and the occurrence of certain 
other physical and mental events. Our identity over time just involves (a) 
Relation R – psychological connectedness and/or psychological continuity 
– with the right kind of cause, provided (b) that this relation does not take 
a ‘branching’ form, holding between one person and two different future 
people” (Parfit 1987, 216).1 
1 Moreover, Parfit (1987, 259–260) claims: “(2) It is not true that our identity is always de-
terminate. I can always ask. ‘Am I about to die?’ But it is not true that, in every case, this 
question must have an answer, which must be either Yes or No. In some cases this would 
be an empty question ; (3) There are two unities to be explained: the unity of conscious-
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In Parfit’s opinion there is no answer to the question of personal identity 
in time, that is why, this question should be replaced by a question about 
Relation R status. The continuity of a person’s existence depends directly 
on his mental/psychological life continuity of which brain is the foundation. 
This continuity does not have to include the person’s identity: in many cases 
the answer to the question whether X in t1 time is identical to Y in t2 time 
is not possible because psychological connectedness and/or psychological 
continuity between the two people is only partial or because that answer 
to the question about identical nature will be the case of authoritarian 
decision (Huzarek 2016, 108).
Fundamentally important, according to Parfit, is Relation R: reasoned 
psychological connectedness and/or psychological continuity. If the personal 
identity is based exclusively on psychological continuity, the person/subject 
is not an independent or separately existing “fact” regardless of body and 
physical relations with the environment as well as a person/subject is not 
“something” existing regardless of mental occurrences. 
Using the implications of the so-called knowledge argument I would like 
to reason in favor of the following conclusions: (1) a person/subject is a “fact” 
i r r e d u c i b l e  t o  body and physical occurrences with the environment 
and (2) a subject is something/”fact” non-reducible to mental occurrences.
The Knowledge Argument  
against Constitutive Reductionism
The knowledge argument is a thought experiment to argue against physi-
calism and functionalism. It is based on the story of an imagined brilliant 
ness at any time, and the unity of a whole life. These two unities cannot be explained by 
claiming that different experiences are had by the same person. These unities must be ex-
plained by describing the relations between these many experiences, and their relations 
to this person’s brain. And we can refer to these experiences, and fully describe the rela-
tions between them, without claiming that these experiences are had by a person; (4) Per-
sonal identity is not what matters. What fundamentally matters is Relation R, with any 
cause. This relation is what matters even when, as in a case where one person is R-related 
to two other people, Relation R does not provide personal identity. Two other relations 
may have some slight importance: physical continuity, and physical similarity, [...]”. 
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neuro-physiologist Mary who spends her entire life in a room where she can 
only see black and white and her only connection with the outside world 
is a black and white monitor. Despite the fact that she becomes the best 
neuro-physiologist in the world and knows everything there is to know about 
physical structure of a brain and its functionality, has all the information 
about what colours are and, what follows, she has all physical information 
about what happens in retina when we see colours as well as the rules of 
how the light refracts. One day Mary is released from her prison and having 
a sensory experience of red – let us say when seeing a red strawberry – she 
says: “So this is a red colour” or “This is what experiencing/seeing red is.” Frank 
Jackson, who was the first to phrase this thought experiment, deduces: De-
spite her brilliant knowledge as a neuro-physiologist Mary did not know what 
it is like to have a sensory experience of red. Hence even complete knowledge 
about physical facts, that relate to sensory perception and accurate brain 
activities still misses something vitally important (Jackson 1982, 127–136).
The extended version of knowledge argument is as follows (Nida-Rumeli 
2010):
Premise P 1: Mary has all the knowledge about human mechanism of 
seeing colours. 
Consequence C 1: Mary knows all the physical facts about seeing colours 
before her release from her black and white room.
Premise P 2: There exists some kind of knowledge about seeing colours 
that Mary does not have.
Consequence C 2: There are certain facts about seeing colours which 
Mary did not have before her release.
Consequence C 3: There are non-physical facts about seeing colours.
Non-physical facts about seeing colours (or other sensory experiences 
which are accompanied by characteristic features of mental experience) 
are called qualia. 
There are numerous studies on the question of qualia as well as abundant 
philosophical dispute on their nature and properties, etc. The aim of this 
article is not to concentrate on this issue. My intention is to adopt minimal 
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assumptions: provided that there exist nonphysical facts concerning the 
perception of colours, we have to assume that there exists the subject that 
is different from those nonphysical facts.
Conclusion 1 – a person/subject is a “fact” which cannot be reduced to 
body and physical occurrences with the environment
 
Consciousness appearing during sensory experiences and derivatives 
regarding these experiences, reminders or sensations based on these images 
is the so-called phenomenal consciousness.2 Klawiter describes this kind 
of consciousness in such a manner.
I look at the red strawberry. I recognize that it is red and identification of 
this feature is accompanied by a conscious experience of red. This recognition 
of red (detection) and conscious experience of red are two different processes. 
The first one is called senseption. A man is equipped with a “biological 
device” to recognize colours – in other words, using a technical language – 
a subsystem of sensory optic system.3 The recognition of stimulus feature 
2 Klawiter (2012, 356–372) distinguishes phenomenal consciousness from constitutive 
consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness is a “reaction” to the direct brain answer on 
what it registers from the surrounding (it is not a direct reaction to the state of the world 
but a direct reaction (known as experience) to the state of mind caused by non-objec-
tive reality). Constitutive consciousness is a complicated creation of the mind created 
from components that, among others, are effects of its previous activity. Chalmers (2010, 
64–73) distinguished phenomenal consciousness and psychological consciousness. Psy-
chological consciousness and consciousness are functional terms. According to Chalmers, 
consciousness is a state in which a subject has access to some information that it can use 
to control behaviour. Conscious mental actions include, among others, being in reality 
(an ability to cope with surroundings), ability to relate, self-consciousness , attention, 
gained knowledge. Ziemińska (2012, 393–426) distinguishes introspective consciousness 
(act/reflexive consciousness) apart from accompanying consciousness (the latter one is 
called great-consciousness by Husserl, Ingarden calls it an experience intuition and Judycki 
uses a term simple consciousness.). Lieberman (et al. 2009, 201–251), however, relying on 
a naturalized concept of qualia presented by Ranamachandran and Hirstein, creates a the-
ory of bi-process model – instinctive system-X and reflexive system-C. In a way, these 
distinctions overlap. 
3 Starting from retinal cones, in other words, photosensitive receptors of the retina which 
absorb light in different range of waves length, to V4 field in visual cortex that analyzes 
colors and contrasts and V5 field which is responsible for general movement perception 
and its direction.
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as a red colour is the effect of the senseption process, namely the reception 
and detection of physical stimulus features which reach the organism’s 
receptors and consequently they reach certain neural changes in the brain. 
Senseption differs from perception because senseption’s task is to identify 
a stimulus feature, whereas perception’s task is to gather information about 
features of the object which is the source of the stimulus. 
Alongside senseption, another process takes place, namely a conscious 
sense that takes place when “the biological colour detector” is in a certain 
state. A conscious experience of red coexists with the final stage of sensep-
tion process. It is a specific mental state which relies on the feeling that 
“I am red” (this phrase is an analogue to “I am sick” or “I am cold”). This 
state does not refer to the object’s surface but to the way it is seen, to the 
process of seeing. Therefore by saying “I am red” (“I feel red”) I am saying 
nothing about the state of the light, I am saying something about a certain 
feature of experiencing a colour that I am currently fulfilling. The attempt to 
describe such a state using language turns out to be impossible: a conscious 
experience of red appears, which cannot be described in a way so that it can 
be apprehended on what “it is like to feel red”. 
Therefore it can be said that a conscious experience accompanies – as it 
seems – a well-known and able to be described in psycho-physical language 
sensory process. So a conscious experience of red is not independent from 
this physical base. The experience itself though – because of its specific and 
subjective character – has no physical character and eludes any physical 
description.4 The fundamental problem is not whether what is physical and 
what is conscious affect each other.5 The problem in incomprehensibility of 
4 Physical state coexists with conscious state. In a way, the study of consciousness is to 
determine a correlation between physical and mental states.
5 Francis Crick and Christof Koch (2008, 302–323) claim that with a current state of knowl-
edge we are not able to define consciousness. It is, however, possible to find a neural 
consciousness correlate, which will be defined as a “minimal set of neural occurrences 
that cause a specific aspect of aware percept”. Vilajanur S. Ramachandran and William 
Hirstein (2008, 324–363) propose a theory that “neural location of qualia is the set of 
neurons in lower, primary sensory area because it is them that send connections to frontal 
lobes where so many of the so-called higher functions happen.” They also claim that most 
of activity connected with conscious experience takes place in frontal lobes which are an 
actual interface between perception and action.
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this relation, the way what is unaware and is an object of observation can 
be identical or remains in correlation with something I do not know from 
observation but I simply feel. The existence of a conscious experience rests 
on being-a-close-known (Frank 2008, 132–140).
Colin McGinn says about “cognitive closure” that it is based on a rule 
that because of some primary reasons I cannot determine the element 
that connects neural and mental processes.6 “A type of mind M is cogni-
tively closed with respect to a property P (or theory T) if and only if the 
concept-forming procedures at M’s disposal cannot extend to a grasp of P 
(or an understanding of T)” (McGinn 1989, 350). According to McGinn, we 
learn nothing about brain from the consciousness fact. On the other hand, 
brain studies do not allow us to determine what feature is responsible 
for emerging of consciousness and introduction of a new term to explain 
another term must require the criterion of homogeneousness to be obeyed. 
However, the term of what is conscious and the term of what is physical 
does not fulfill the criterion.
Without settling the dispute about correlation of physical and mental 
changes it can be said that quality and therefore individuality and uniqueness 
of conscious experiences are in a way depended on the quality of sensory 
process, unique sensual sensitivity and also previous experiences in life 
history (Koch 2008, 251).7
There is no way to tell, as Parfit does, that “our existence just involves 
the existence of our brains and bodies, and the doing of our deeds, and 
the thinking of our thoughts, and the occurrence of certain other physical 
and mental events.” (Parfit 1984, 216). The qualities of qualia are not 
independent from sensory body sensitivity but they are not limited to it. 
The existence of non-physical facts about seeing colors as a phenomenal 
quality of experiences and their unique subjectivity indicates a “fact” that 
6 It seems that here McGinn assumes a hidden layer of awareness, we do not have access to, 
which is a certain indirect state between what is physical and what is mental. 
7 Thomas (STh I-II, q 63, a 1) says: “Because of body adjustment some are better or worse 
prepared to certain virtues along with when actions of certain sensual strengths are par-
tially connected to certain body parts which adjustments help or bother those strengths 
and rational strengths which use sensual strengths to perform proper actions”. 
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a unique subject, which cannot be reduced to body and physical occurrences 
with the environment8.
Conclusion 2 – subject is “something/someone” non-reducible to mental 
states
If nonphysical facts exist, then there must be a qualia’s subject, a subject 
with certain properties.
Consciousness has a time stretch and it occurs in time: the past, present 
and future. The future is an object of plans, expectations which do not 
“really” exist yet. The present exists but – if it can be expressed in this 
way – to a limited extent because it fades into the past very quickly. The 
most important dimension of time stretch is the past. The existence of the 
present, expecting the future and experiencing, living the past are incidents 
that occur for someone or “something” who can make temporary dimensions 
of stream of consciousness a subject of their reflection. Such a subject 
defines future plans, has self-consciousness in the moment of planning 
the future and can reflect on the experience of itself in the past. Intentional 
referring to different temporary dimensions of stream of consciousness requires 
a subject which has certain conditions, some things it credits, some denounces, 
sometimes it becomes aware of something, sometimes it phrases some points, 
etc. (Judycki 2004, 310). 
Self-consciousness cannot be a simple cognition of consciousness 
according to a object-subject model. For in this model it is assumed that 
conscious states of mind differ from unconscious by the presence of a certain 
higher level of state which makes them a cognition object. This, however, 
8 We may somehow broaden the argument from knowledge. Let us image Mary who has been 
blind since childhood and has never seen any colors, the beauty of the world or subtle 
shades of colors. Despite that she becomes a world-famous neurophysiologist and knows 
everything about the physical structure of the brain, possesses all the physical informa-
tion about what happens in the retina when a man sees colors. Mary can not tell what 
the experiencing of red or blue is. One day someone gives her a hot stone to hold in the 
right hand saying “this is what red is like” and a cold stone to hold in the left hand saying: 
“this is a blue color.” The process of senseption described by Klawiter does not take place, 
however, may we say that a specific experiencing of red/blue is formed by Mary? 
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must lead to regresum ad infinium. That is why, as it seems, the only solution 
is to acknowledge primary self-consciousness, to assume that consciousness 
assumes self-consciousness (Frank 2002, 119–120).
As a person/subject, I have a predicative knowledge about myself: 
I know how old I am, what my height is, I know I like red wine, I know what 
features, properties of character I possess. This attribution of any proper-
ties to oneself assumes the knowledge of to whom I attribute them. The 
predicative knowledge assumes different kind of knowledge about oneself: 
the knowledge that is in a way a direct, outside predicative. 
Beyond any objectifying reflection a substantial subject has direct 
knowledge about itself. According to Judycki, intellectual clarity (different 
from sensual clarity) belongs to the direct experience of oneself as a subject. 
It is an experience of oneself as a being existing in time and centre from 
which different acts originate. Intellectual and clear perception of ourselves 
is expressed with the word “I”. We are not subjects of this knowledge but 
the knowledge itself. It is an absolutely unique knowledge because it is 
a unity of idea and clarity of its own kind. This knowledge can only be 
fulfilled but it cannot be expressed conceptually. The substantial subject 
as a reflexive transcendence9 is both act and activity. Aquinas says that its 
action constitutes operatio per se. In cognition of oneself an experience 
of total undifferentiation between the subject (being) and cognition of 
this subject (being) is fulfilled. Simple consciousness is not based on the 
subject-object relation but can take place on one level. Cognition and its 
9 It means that a subject comes “outside itself” in order to accept some subjective content 
(this content includes: sensual clarity, intellectual – abstract contents and contents of 
inner experience) and simultaneously a subject expresses this content, “comes back into 
itself” to assimilate expressed contents whilst keeping its unity and simplicity. This sub-
ject identifies with none of the components of its stream of consciousness , none of its 
profound values; it has its own experiences but it does not identify itself with this experi-
ence, it is not this experience; a subject is not an additional stream of consciousness that 
stretches in time. According to Judycki (2004, 316–327), a subject is characterized by the 
following properties: non-temporality (it is not timeless – it experiences time but does 
not identify itself with any features of its character nor with the contents of its memo-
ries) and non-spatiality; simple unity and unique simplicity; unidentical with any of the 
results stretched in time.
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subject are blended together due to the lack of mediation through notions 
(Judycki 2004, 227–239).
Therefore, self-cognition assumes previous self-consciousness. This 
self-consciousness has, according to Manfred Frank, the following features: 
(1) it is not reducible to physicalism or naturalism;10 (2) as a de se attitude 
is not reducible to de dicto and de re”11; (3) self –consciousness is a kind of 
knowledge but a non-propositional (pre-propositional) knowledge, it is not 
a subjective knowledge, being, however, a real cognition. For it is a subjective 
knowledge that eludes in a significant way objective knowledge about the 
world (Frank 2008, 123. 353).12
It can be then said that a subject is an atemporal unity of existing (Ju-
dycki 2004, 317–320). In a way it exists out of time because the time and its 
changes do not touch the existence of the subject. Simultaneously, however, 
the subject is not “timeless” because it experiences time. The former “I” 
10 The acceptance of non-reducible “subjective factor” must constrict a monopoly of exact 
sciences in explaining the world. But according to Frank (2008, 109–111), this step should 
be taken because of few reasons: 1. If we resign from treating ourselves as non-reducible 
subjects then we will not be able to study philosophy anymore. It will happen because 
what we mean when we address ourselves we could not separate from philosophical ob-
jects and explaining the phenomenon of human reality, its inner world, every kind of 
experience must remain only in exact sciences expertise; 2. Second intuition invokes 
a way of expression which is characteristic for philosophy, namely an argumentation. The 
argumentation differs fundamentally from science language as well as from everyday lan-
guage of discourse. Arguments lead to certain beliefs using different way than a coercion 
supported by some kind of obviousness or a logical or causal coercion; 3. Serious ethical 
consequences, namely categorical imperative (Act in such a way that you treat humanity, 
whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, 
but always at the same time as an end.) loses its addressee. Indeed – there is no such a thing 
as non-reducible subject, the implementation of this imperative lacks fundamentum in re.
11 Frank (2008, 121–124) explains that epistemic attitude towards oneself – the so-called 
“de se attitude” cannot be reduced to the de dicto attitude or the de re attitude. The de dicto 
attitude is an attitude towards certain dictum on account of what was said, on account of 
judgement content (proposition). The de re attitude is an attitude towards an object. In 
case of self-knowledge we deal neither with content-related knowledge nor with objective 
knowledge.
12 Frank adds: if a language is a whole of what can be made understandable, in relation to 
the content of opinion (propositionem), then self-consciousness is not a linguistic occur-
rence. Some kinds of our knowledge cannot be expressed in indicative opinions, but they 
are still knowledge.
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is former only seemingly because it is the same “I” that lasts in a different 
time. In an introspective experience, sustained in different changes of our 
experiences, we can talk about some kind of the “core of existence.” The 
existence experienced by a subject is a foundation to experience time in 
general. 
Parfit argues that “I” in T1 time (in the past) does not have to be iden-
tical with “I” in T2 time (in the present). However, this seems to be a wrong 
conception. The error has its source either in (1) confusion, mixing a subject 
with characteristic and habitual features which throughout the life could 
alter completely or in (2) mixing a subject with its own reminders. 
However, a substantial subject is not the same as its features of char-
acter, possessions or memories. For these properties and memories can be 
objectified by a subject, can be a subject of reflection and therefore they do 
not equate with “I”. A subject is therefore “something” that does not identify 
with the result of states in time regardless of whether it will be a neural or 
physical state of brain or whether it will be a state of stream of consciousness 
or qualia as a phenomenal quality of experience. A subject is able to cross 
a material content of stream of consciousness, it is therefore “something” 
which cannot be reduced to metal states. It is characterized by an ability 
to analyze, synthesize and understand all kinds of data, structures, rules 
and mechanisms. Even if there is an unconscious dimension of our mind, 
namely a system of rules anchored in a brain to which a subject has no 
direct access – still then the subject is able to make effects of unconscious 
data processing a subject of reflection. 
That way a subject does not identify with its stream of consciousness 
and does not identify with its brain. If through mind we are to understand 
a structure organized according to rules in some way anchored in a brain 
then subject is not a mind.
 A substantial subject is a specific “crystal of unique structure” (Judycki 
2004, 327) which focalizes data provided by senses and by a mind/brain 
that it possesses. It is a “crystal of unique structure” and because of that it 
receives data (both on a sensory level, and the level of sensory sensitivity as 
well as on the level of processing data by mind/brain ) in a characteristic way.
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